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Richard Juhnke General Attorney Federal Regulatory Affairs 1850 M Street, NW, 11th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone: (202) 828-7437 Fax: (202) 857-1792 E-mail: richard.juhnke @mail.sprint.com

EX PARTE PRESENTATION

November 5, 1998
RECEIVED

Magalie Roman Salas Secretary Federal Communications Commission 1919 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20554

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONS
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

NOV - 5 1998

Re: CC Docket No. 96-128

Dear Ms. Salas:

Attached for inclusion in the record in the referenced proceeding is a copy of the transcript of the oral argument before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in MCI Telecommunications Corporation v. FCC, No. 97-1675, held on May 7, 1998. A copy of the cover page and pp. 25-26, 31-33, and 38-42 are being furnished to Kyle Dixon of Commissioner Powell's office.

An original and one copy of this letter are being filed.

Sincerely, Richard Juliah

Attachment

c: Kyle Dixon (w/pages referenced above attached)

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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, Petitioner,

No. 97-1675, Et al.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.

Pages 1 to 63

Washington, D.C. May 7, 1998

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

: No. 97-1675,

et al.

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

Thursday, May 7, 1998

Washington, D.C.

The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument, pursuant to notice:

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE HARRY T. EDWARDS, Chief Judge
THE HONORABLE LAURENCE H. SILBERMAN, Judge
THE HONORABLE JUDITH W. ROGERS, Judge

APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of the Petitioners MCI, et al.:

JOHN B. MORRIS, JR., ESQ. Jenner & Block 601 13th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005

On Behalf of the Petitioners III Public Telecom. Assn.:

ALBERT H. KRAMER, ESQ.

On Behalf of Respondents:

KENNETH DOROSHOW, ESQ. Federal Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554

On Behalf of Intervenors:

MICHAEL KELLOGG, ESQ.

C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S

ORAL ARGUMENT OF:

Albert H. Kramer, Esq.,

| John B. Morris, Esq., on behalf of Petitioners MCI | 4 |
|--|----|
| Albert H. Kramer, Esq., on behalf of Petitioners, Illinois Public Telecommunications Association | 15 |
| Kenneth Doroshow, Esq. on behalf of Respondents | 24 |
| Michael Kellogg, Esq., on behalf of Intervenors | 42 |
| John B. Morris, Esq., on behalf of Petitioners MCI - Rebuttal | 55 |

Telecommunications Association - Rebuttal 58

on behalf of Petitioners, Illinois Public

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

| 1 | THE CLERK: Case No. 97-1675, et al. |
|----|--|
| 2 | MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION |
| 3 | v. |
| 4 | FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION |
| 5 | AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
| 6 | Mr. Morris for Petitioners MCI, et al., |
| 7 | Mr. Kramer for Petitioners Illinois Public |
| 8 | Telecommunications Association, Mr. Doroshow for |
| 9 | Respondents, and Mr. Kellogg for Intervenors. |
| 10 | MR. MORRIS: Good morning, Your Honor. |
| 11 | THE COURT: Mr. Morris, this case is under |
| 12 | reconsideration before the Commission. Why should we |
| 13 | be hearing it at this point? |
| 14 | ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN B. MORRIS, ESQ. |
| 15 | ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS MCI |
| 16 | Your Honor, it's would it be |
| 17 | appropriate for this Court to defer to the FCC's |
| 18 | reconsideration if the FCC were here before the Court, |
| 19 | essentially admitting the errors that Petitioners here |
| 20 | have raised. But the FCC is doing that. The FCC is |
| 21 | vigorously defending |
| 22 | THE COURT: Wait, wait, that's not |
| 23 | responsive to a question of ripeness. |
| 24 | MR MORRIS: Well in terms of judicial |

efficiency and judicial economy, and the FCC, we will certainly be in a Payphone IV for if the FCC goes through with its reconsideration and continues to promulgate its scheme as it has done --THE COURT: Well, but then the Court would only look at it once. We don't want to keep looking If someone is at this thing over and over again. seeking reconsideration on the precise issue before us, then the FCC is going to do whatever it's going to do whether it's more of the same or less of the same or whatever. We don't want to take it time after time after time and judicial prudence warrants that we wait until the Agency is done. Why is that wrong? MR. MORRIS: Well, the FCC's errors here are so fundamental --THE COURT: That's doesn't --THE COURT: You mean your constitutional should take over the FCC? That's not an answer. THE COURT: I mean all of you who are going to get up today on. have to do better than that. That's not an answer in

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normal prudential jurisprudence when we're talking

about questions of ripeness. If the matter is still

before the Agency, it's a large issue, we don't want

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to take it several times. 1 I mean that's the whole 2 point of reconsideration. If the errors are glaring as you suggest, then maybe they'll notice it. 3 Well, except it is crystal MR. MORRIS: 4 5 clear we have a situation as in the Food Marketing 6 <u>Institute v. ICC</u>, where the Agency has grasped on to 7 a scheme and is --8 THE COURT: But reconsideration may mitigate whatever problems you perceive. 9 That's my 10 Let's assume that what they've done is question. written an opinion that says what follows is patently 11 12 student and then indeed it is indeed patently stupid, 13 that's still not an answer to say that they've said patently stupid, if it's 14 something is under 15 consideration, reconsideration. Why in heaven's name 16 would we waste time struggling with this issue? It's 17 like us weighing in on the whole reconsideration process and that's not our role. Our role is to judge 18 19 what they do. 20 MR. MORRIS: The FCC's reconsideration 21 process is focused on the scheme that it's adopted. 22 That scheme fundamentally is flawed. 23 So your basic point is that THE COURT: 24 starting at 35 cents is fundamentally wrong and the

reconsideration goes to all of the offsets off that,

right? 1 MR. MORRIS: Everything the FCC --2 THE COURT: Is brought. Suppose they came 3 up with so many different offsets that they dropped it 4 5 down to 10 cents. You'd be delighted. You're absolutely right. MR. MORRIS: 6 THE COURT: You wouldn't be back. 7 Frankly, even if they're stupid, if they come out with 8 a nice result, you'd love it. 9 So --10 In other words, even if the THE COURT: 11 foundation was absurd, the 35 cent foundation was 12 absurd, you were right on that. You came out with a 13 number that was so low you --14 You'd still be coming back 15 THE COURT: saying we want to go even lower because the foundation 16 17 is wrong and well, probably not. In this case where even a MR. MORRIS: 18 single penny of error translates to \$30 million. 19 THE COURT: No, we understand the point. 20 We understand the point, but as Chief Judge says, this 21 is like a moving target for us. 22 MR. MORRIS: Unavoidably, the fundamental 23 foundation of the FCC's order will be before the Court 24 because even if the FCC goes way the other way --

| 1 | THE COURT: I mean you can go back and say |
|----|---|
| 2 | don't be afraid to reconsider the fundamental premise |
| 3 | too. |
| 4 | THE COURT: Have you sought |
| 5 | reconsideration too? You haven't? |
| 6 | MR. MORRIS: Excuse me? |
| 7 | THE COURT: Have you sought |
| 8 | reconsideration as well? |
| 9 | MR. MORRIS: No. |
| 10 | THE COURT: But everybody else has sought |
| 11 | reconsideration. So it's sort of a strange situation, |
| 12 | isn't it? All the Intervenors have sought |
| 13 | reconsideration, including AT&T, who is the same |
| 14 | position you're in. Your interests are exactly the |
| 15 | same as best I can tell. |
| 16 | MR. MORRIS: That is correct. In this |
| 17 | case, however, Your Honor, and what the FCC has done, |
| 18 | we would submit, to boldly and baldly ignore this |
| 19 | Court's directions in the <u>Payphone I</u> case. |
| 20 | THE COURT: They've done that before. |
| 21 | (Laughter.) |
| 22 | THE COURT: It's surely not a novelty. |
| 23 | Judge Silberman took the words out of my mouth. |
| 24 | THE COURT: It's not a first. |
| 25 | MR. MORRIS: It may not be the first time, |
| ļ | NEAL D. OBOOO |

| 1 | but I would submit that it would be appropriate for |
|----|---|
| 2 | this Court to at this point of the juncture correct |
| 3 | the FCC and say no FCC, you apparently did not |
| 4 | understand <u>Payphone I</u> , do it right so that the next |
| 5 | time it comes up to us it does reflect what |
| 6 | THE COURT: What's the status quo, |
| 7 | counsel? |
| 8 | MR. MORRIS: Excuse me? |
| 9 | THE COURT: What's the status quo? |
| 10 | MR. MORRIS: I'm sorry? |
| 11 | THE COURT: Money status quo. Who is |
| 12 | paying what? |
| 13 | MR. MORRIS: Right now, IXC and ultimately |
| 14 | 800 subscribers |
| 15 | THE COURT: How much are you weighing? |
| 16 | MR. MORRIS: 28.4 cents. |
| 17 | THE COURT: You're paying the rate that |
| 18 | came out of this ruling? |
| 19 | MR. MORRIS: Well, the actual payments |
| 20 | have been, it's a 6-month lag, so I frankly don't |
| 21 | I can't tell the Court whether payments have been made |
| 22 | today, but right around April or May or this year is |
| 23 | when the actual payments will actually start being |
| 24 | made. |

THE COURT:

25

All right, and what was it

| 1 | before that? You were paying nothing? |
|----|---|
| 2 | MR. MORRIS: Well, before that we were |
| 3 | paying approximately \$6 per phone charge. |
| 4 | THE COURT: Which roughly amounted to how |
| 5 | much, if you convert to the per call? |
| 6 | MR. MORRIS: Less than 28.4 cents. |
| 7 | THE COURT: So in April or May you'll have |
| 8 | to go up to 28.4? |
| 9 | MR. MORRIS: Right, starting back in |
| 10 | October of last year, the payments are to be made in |
| 11 | this time period. |
| 12 | THE COURT: Well, I don't mean to suggest |
| 13 | how counsel might proceed, but if we were considering |
| 14 | holding or sending this back in light of |
| 15 | reconsideration, there's certainly a reasonable |
| 16 | argument to be made in that you've filed a motion to |
| 17 | the effect that the rates shouldn't go into effect |
| 18 | while the reconsideration is going on. |
| 19 | MR. MORRIS: Absolutely and we |
| 20 | THE COURT: You hadn't said that in your |
| 21 | brief. I mean that might be underlying what maybe |
| 22 | what your underlying concern is. |
| 23 | MR. MORRIS: Well, the Petitioners did |
| 24 | file a motion for stay with this Court which this |
| 25 | Court did deny. If a stay of the order had been |

| 1 | entered, we would be more than happy, I'd be happy to |
|----|--|
| 2 | sit down right now. If this Court would |
| 3 | THE COURT: What was the I don't |
| 4 | remember how did we deny? Did we deny it deferring |
| 5 | to the merits or just denied it? |
| 6 | MR. MORRIS: I'm afraid it was a very, |
| 7 | very short and simple denied. |
| 8 | THE COURT: Well, then it should be easy |
| 9 | for you to remember it. |
| 10 | MR. MORRIS: I'm trying to remember if |
| 11 | there was a subtle nuance within the order denying it. |
| 12 | I think it was simply a |
| 13 | THE COURT: The subtle nuances only come |
| 14 | from the FCC, never from us. |
| 15 | (Laughter.) |
| 16 | MR. MORRIS: But absolutely, if this Court |
| 17 | would direct the FCC to stay the order and in fact, I |
| 18 | would certainly suggest that the |
| 19 | THE COURT: You did, in fact, make that |
| 20 | motion? |
| 21 | MR. MORRIS: We absolutely made the |
| 22 | motion. |
| 23 | THE COURT: What were the grounds for your |
| 24 | motion? |
| 25 | MR. MORRIS: The grounds for the motion |
| | NEAL R. GROSS |

were very, very similar to the grounds that we're 1 2 now, almost identical, really, verv presenting 3 parallel. Most --Did you bring it to the THE COURT: 4 Court's attention that these matters were under 5 reconsideration before the Agency? 6 MR. MORRIS: The Court was aware of that 7 during the briefing. 8 THE COURT: Did you bring to the Court's 9 attention as part of your motion for stay that these 10 rule still under 11 much of the was matters, reconsideration before the Agency? 12 MR. MORRIS: I honestly can't tell you if 13 our motion papers mentioned that. I assume it did. 14 We certainly gave a status --15 Well, if your argument was THE COURT: 16 you're going to win for sure, therefore you should get 17 a stay, in a complex case, that's hard to prevail, but 18 19 if you told the Court that there was this reconsideration going on in the meantime that would 20 have added to the strength of your motion to stay --21 Well, our order said you THE COURT: 22 simply didn't grant, you simply didn't meet the 23 standard. Now if you didn't -- if it said you didn't 24 meet the standard, the normal standard for a stay. 25

| _ | Now if you didn't include this, that may have been |
|----|--|
| 2 | part of the reason. |
| 3 | MR. MORRIS: Well, I believe that we did |
| 4 | make clear that the order was under reconsideration at |
| 5 | the FCC. |
| 6 | THE COURT: In the motion for a stay? |
| 7 | MR. MORRIS: I believe we did, and I don't |
| 8 | have the papers in front of me and I don't want to |
| 9 | THE COURT: But your position now is that |
| 10 | everything you've raised here is pending before the |
| 11 | FCC as well, now? |
| 12 | MR. MORRIS: I believe that most of the |
| 13 | issues I can't say every single |
| 14 | THE COURT: Is there anything that is not |
| 15 | before the FCC? Or is there anything to bar the FCC |
| 16 | from considering all the issues that you've raised |
| 17 | here? |
| 18 | MR. MORRIS: No, there's nothing that |
| 19 | would bar the FCC from considering all the issues. |
| 20 | But the FCC has made very plainly clear that it is |
| 21 | very dubious of the possibility that if it lowers the |
| 22 | compensation rate that it would order a retroactive |
| 23 | adjustment |
| 24 | THE COURT: I was going to ask you about |
| 25 | that. |
| | |

| 1 | MR. MORRIS: Excuse me? |
|----|--|
| 2 | THE COURT: I was going to ask you about |
| 3 | that. |
| 4 | MR. MORRIS: So our clients right now are |
| 5 | supposedly, apparently, liable for 28.4 cents with no |
| 6 | clear prospect |
| 7 | THE COURT: But if we granted you a stay, |
| 8 | that would tend to concentrate the mind of the FCC and |
| 9 | rather get a pretty quick action from them on |
| 10 | reconsideration. |
| 11 | MR. MORRIS: Absolutely. If we had a stay |
| 12 | and certainly |
| 13 | THE COURT: It would certainly also |
| 14 | concentrate the mind of the RBOCs, too. |
| 15 | MR. MORRIS: I think it would and as the |
| 16 | FCC did in <u>Payphone II</u> , in the second Report and |
| 17 | Order, it moved very, very quickly. We would even |
| 18 | suggest too hastily to readopt its scheme |
| 19 | THE COURT: When did this rate go into |
| 20 | effect? |
| 21 | MR. MORRIS: Excuse me? |
| 22 | THE COURT: When did this rate go into |
| 23 | effect? |
| 24 | MR. MORRIS: October of 1997. |
| 25 | THE COURT: No, no, I thought you said it |
| | • |

| 1 | didn't go into effect until April or |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. MORRIS: I'm sorry, the rate went into |
| 3 | effect. The rate is in effect today. It was in |
| 4 | effect on October of 1997. The process for payments |
| 5 | take about six months long and so actually |
| 6 | THE COURT: So you presumably are liable |
| 7 | for that amount, but it hasn't been paid? |
| 8 | MR. MORRIS: I don't know if |
| 9 | THE COURT: So if you got a stay, that |
| 10 | could just be hell, that check not be sent out. |
| 11 | That's the way you're thinking. Okay. |
| 12 | MR. MORRIS: Absolutely. Now I see that |
| 13 | my time has run out. |
| 14 | THE COURT: It has. Yes, I agree, it's |
| 15 | run out. |
| 16 | (Laughter.) |
| 17 | THE COURT: If we need to talk with you |
| 18 | more about the merits, we will. |
| 19 | MR. MORRIS: That's fine. Thanks very |
| 20 | much. |
| 21 | ORAL ARGUMENT OF ALBERT H. KRAMER, ESQ. |
| 22 | ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS, ILLINOIS PUBLIC |
| 23 | TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION |
| 24 | I'm Albert H. Kramer. I represent the |
| 25 | payphone parties and Intervenors in this case. These |

| 1 | providers are all independent payphone providers. |
|----|---|
| 2 | They are not RBOCs. |
| 3 | THE COURT: Same question, counselor. |
| 4 | MR. KRAMER: Your Honor, the information |
| 5 | that there was reconsideration pending was before the |
| 6 | Court at the time the Court ruled. The FCC had raised |
| 7 | it in its opposing papers. |
| 8 | We did not oppose deferring the briefing |
| 9 | on this case until reconsideration occurred. |
| 10 | THE COURT: So you wouldn't oppose our |
| 11 | sending it back now? |
| 12 | MR. KRAMER: We would not. |
| 13 | THE COURT: I only have one question, was |
| 14 | one of us on the Panel? |
| 15 | THE COURT: Yes, Judge Rogers. |
| 16 | THE COURT: Oh, gosh. I was about to say |
| 17 | if I was on the Panel we're certainly capable of |
| 18 | recognizing that typically when an issue comes up on |
| 19 | motions and even if we deny it, we tend to think that |
| 20 | we can look at it again on merits. |
| 21 | MR. KRAMER: Your Honor, I would agree, |
| 22 | you certainly can do that. We did oppose a stay. We |
| 23 | are concerned while, Judge Silberman, you mentioned |
| 24 | the RBOCs. There is an independents part of this |
| 25 | industry that is far more fragile and in light of the |

| 1 | fact that the Court vacated the order last time, there |
|----|--|
| 2 | is very, very little compensation and the cash flow |
| 3 | crisis is desperate for the independent industry. So |
| 4 | to the extent |
| 5 | THE COURT: Desperate you weren't |
| 6 | getting enough in the past, the \$6? |
| 7 | MR. KRAMER: Your Honor, we were getting |
| 8 | the \$6. That amount to about 4 cents per call based |
| 9 | on the record. |
| 10 | THE COURT: You mean this is a big jump |
| 11 | from 4 cents to 28 cents? So this is an enormous |
| 12 | difference, right? |
| 13 | MR. KRAMER: There is an enormous |
| 14 | difference, but |
| 15 | THE COURT: That's the effective |
| 16 | difference, 4 cents to 28? |
| 17 | MR. KRAMER: That's the effective |
| 18 | difference, Your Honor. |
| 19 | THE COURT: There's no cash flow now |
| 20 | anyway because you haven't had any money paid out on |
| 21 | the new rate. |
| 22 | MR. KRAMER: The cash is beginning to flow |
| 23 | right now as we speak. The checks are beginning to |
| 24 | come from the carriers, but you have to understand |
| 25 | that while that's an enormous increase, at the same |

| 1 | time there has been a concomitant fail in the volume |
|----|---|
| 2 | of cash because that dial around traffic is taking |
| 3 | away all the cash generating traffic, the zero plus |
| 4 | traffic that normally generates the cash. So you have |
| 5 | seen a fall |
| 6 | THE COURT: I don't understand that. You |
| 7 | mean just because dial around is expanding? |
| 8 | MR. KRAMER: Yes, Your Honor. |
| 9 | THE COURT: Because of what? Why is dial |
| 10 | around expanding? |
| 11 | MR. KRAMER: The typical caller used to |
| 12 | walk up to a payphone and dial 0+ and then the number |
| 13 | and so forth. That call is a commissionable call for |
| 14 | the payphone provider. What has happened is traffic |
| 15 | has been driven away from the 0+ and into the dial |
| 16 | around calls and so you've had cash flow falling |
| 17 | because of the decline in the |
| 18 | THE COURT: Why has it been driven away |
| 19 | from the 0+? |
| 20 | MR. KRAMER: Because callers are using the |
| 21 | dial around instead of the 0+. |
| 22 | THE COURT: Why are callers using the dial |
| 23 | around? |
| 24 | MR. KRAMER: In part, because of a massive |
| 25 | advertising campaigns by the carriers. If you watch |
| 1 | Į. |

TV, if you read magazines --1 2 THE COURT: Because you don't know whose system you're using, so you've got to use their dial 3 around. 4 Well, that's right. 5 MR. KRAMER: And 6 that's fine. 7 THE COURT: You don't know which carrier has got this call, so yes, to protect yourself because 8 9 you don't know what you're doing, you want to stay 10 with your own carrier so you use the dial around. That's correct. MR. KRAMER: That's 11 correct. And we did not oppose the FCC's requirement 12 that calls be unblocked for that reason. We believe 13 14 callers should have a choice, but at the same time as 15 the carriers drive callers to exercise that choice it 16 does drive down the cash flow. So we're very concerned about having, about the stay issue pending 17 18 the reconsideration because we're in this caste 19 situation. We're not the RBOCs. We don't have parent 20 companies who can keep us afloat, so we're seeing a fall in the cash flow as calls move from 0+ and at the 21 22 same time nothing happening on the dial around side. 23 That was part of the reason for the law.

The law says that payphone compensations were supposed

to be compensated effective nine months after the Act.

24

We're now over two years after the Act. This Court 1 2 has vacated the earlier order. We now have talk of stay of this order. No cash is flowing. 3 Congress would not have put the nine month 4 deadline on if they intended for this to go for 5 payphone providers, and particularly, the independent 6 7 sector. Yes, but suppose we're quite 8 THE COURT: dubious at the FCC's reasoning with respect with the 9 35 cent double proxy. Wouldn't that contribute to our 10 willingly to grant a stay here and shouldn't it have 11 contributed? 12 Now, of course, you're defending that 13 14 proxy. should MR. Honor, it 15 KRAMER: Your contribute, if indeed you are dubious. The FCC and 16 17 Mr. Kellogg will address the merits of that. 18 What I would say is this, while obviously you have to consider that, you also have to consider 19 the fact that you had a statutory mandate. Α 20 statutory mandate was that compensation should be 21 paid. 22 What I would urge you --23 24 THE COURT: On some reasonable grounds. MR. KRAMER: Pardon me? 25

THE COURT: On some reasonable grounds. 1 MR. KRAMER: On some reasonable grounds. 2 What I would urge --3 If they haven't done it, THE COURT: 4 that's not our fault. 5 I understand that, Your MR. KRAMER: 6 7 What I would urge the Court to do is if the Court is inclined to grant the stay to -- in this case 8 recognizing the arguments regarding reconsideration, 9 in fact consider the case because of 10 to extraordinary circumstance that we find ourselves in 11 and the statutory mandate to, in fact, consider this 12 case and give the Commission the guidance it needs 13 14 now. THE COURT: In other words, if we're 15 dubious make it very clear to the Commission that 16 we're dubious because otherwise you're going to face 17 a long delay if they rely on the same premise and come 18 back up again and we knock it out then, then you're 19 facing another year or two is what you're saying? 20 Then we're facing another 21 MR. KRAMER: year or two without any cash. 22 THE COURT: So if we've got some great 23 concerns, you want us to say we've got some great 24 25 concerns?

| 1 | MR. KRAMER: Exactly, Your Honor. And |
|----|--|
| 2 | what I would urge you to do, in fact, is to please |
| 3 | consider the other issues on the merits as well. |
| 4 | THE COURT: You mean the ones all under |
| 5 | the specific reconsideration? |
| 6 | MR. KRAMER: I'm sorry, Your Honor? |
| 7 | THE COURT: All the ones, the add ons or |
| 8 | the off sets under specific reconsideration? |
| 9 | MR. KRAMER: Yes, Your Honor. |
| 10 | THE COURT: That's awful hard for us to |
| 11 | do. |
| 12 | MR. KRAMER: I know that, Your Honor, but |
| 13 | they're very important because even if you tell the |
| 14 | FCC you have grave doubts, the Agency needs guidance |
| 15 | |
| 16 | THE COURT: Arguably, the issue that is |
| 17 | most ripe before us is the 35 cent figure because |
| 18 | nobody is specifically seeking reconsideration on that |
| 19 | although it's implicated in everything. |
| 20 | MR. KRAMER: That's correct. |
| 21 | THE COURT: But if we're dubious about |
| 22 | that, and all the other things are in play |
| 23 | THE COURT: And ar connected to that. |
| 24 | THE COURT: And are connected to that, I |
| 25 | don't understand why we should even express a view on |
| I | 1 |

| 1 | all the other questions, although there is one issue |
|----|--|
| 2 | that puzzles me that I would be prepared to ask the |
| 3 | FCC about and maybe you would and that's the targeting |
| 4 | question. |
| 5 | One of the premises of the FCC's rule was |
| 6 | that the technology of targeting or blocking, targeted |
| 7 | blocking could come in and but I understand from |
| 8 | the briefs that the FCC Bureau has gone the other way |
| 9 | on that. So I'm having a heck of a time trying to |
| 10 | figure out what's going on. |
| 11 | MR. KRAMER: I believe the FCC is prepared |
| 12 | to address that, Your Honor. Our specific points |
| 13 | THE COURT: You don't care about that. |
| 14 | MR. KRAMER: Well, we care about it if it |
| 15 | concerns the Court, obviously. |
| 16 | THE COURT: No, but it doesn't directly |
| 17 | concern you. |
| 18 | MR. KRAMER: It does not directly concern |
| 19 | us. We do not believe |
| 20 | THE COURT: We don't worry about targeted |
| 21 | blocking. |
| 22 | MR. KRAMER: We don't worry about targeted |
| 23 | blocking. And we don't believe targeted blocking is |
| 24 | a valid concern. As I believe FCC counsel will |
| 25 | explain the ECC set the default rate. The question |

before the Court is whether there is a valid rate. 1 there is a valid rate, targeted blocking cannot --2 excuse me, if there is not a valid rate, targeted 3 blocking cannot say that, and if there is a valid 4 rate, targeted blocking should not invalidate the 5 6 rate. The question is, Judge 7 as indicated, the reasonableness of what the FCC has done 8 and we believe that is the issue that should be before 9 10 the Court. I would urge, Your Honor, and I do want to 11 I would urge the reserve some time for rebuttal. 12 Court if you again -- I hear what you're saying and I 13 do agree that the most fundamental issue is the need 14 for guidance on these other issues. We would request 15 the Court at least give the Commission some guidance 16 on the logic it followed in making some of the 17 18 adjustments. I would like to reserve some time for 19 rebuttal, if I may. 20 THE COURT: All right. 21 ORAL ARGUMENT OF KENNETH DOROSHOW, ESQ. 22 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS 23 May it please the Court, my name 24 25 Kenneth Doroshow and I represent the FCC.

outset, if I may address the concerns that the Court 1 has expressed about the possibility of a stay or at 2 postponing its decision until 3 reconsideration proceeding is completed. 4 There may be some value to waiting for the 5 reconsideration, however, we would vigorously oppose 6 a stay and we opposed the stay when there was a motion 7 before the Court. The purpose of Section 276 is quite 8 to provide compensation to the payphone 9 providers and in considering the balance of harm --10 THE COURT: Not any compensation. 11 MR. DOROSHOW: Fair compensation. 12 THE COURT: Right. 13 MR. DOROSHOW: And we believe that --14 THE COURT: Right, but suppose we're of a 15 mind that there's no conceivable way that anyone in 16 their right mind could suggest that the basis here is 17 fair and reasonable? 18 MR. DOROSHOW: I'd be happy to address the 19 elements that --20 THE COURT: No, I mean suppose that were 21 the case, then what do we do? Suppose we're not 22 You give us your best shot and we walk 23 away and say it doesn't do it. All of what we first 24 There's no 25 thought is still there. It's nonsense.

It's not our job to figure out reasonable basis. 1 what's reasonable. We leave it in place because you 2 have to have something? 3 MR. DOROSHOW: Well, as between balancing 4 the harm of vacating the rule or staying the rule or 5 6 not --That's an argument you made THE COURT: 7 last time around on vacating and you lost on that time 8 before the prior Panel which included in the Chief 9 Judge. 10 MR. DOROSHOW: Right. Well, I submit that 11 we will satisfy the Court that the rule is reasonable. 12 THE COURT: Counsel, I'm giving you --13 you've got to give us a better answer. I'm telling 14 you at least in some of our minds, the grounds are 15 very shaky, shaky enough so that you ought to worry a 16 whole lot about whether or not anyone can be convinced 17 that the grounds stated make any sense. 18 Now if that is the prevailing result, what 19 Can you really say tenably that we 20 should we do? should leave this in place if we can't find a 21 reasonable basis for its existence? 22 MR. DOROSHOW: Your Honor, if, in fact, 23 the Court finds the FCC's approach to be absolutely 24 25 unreasonable then --

2 far. That's forcing us to rule on the merits. 3 Let me phrase the question this way. a motion for stay, let's think about this as a motion 4 5 for stay at this point, we should consider the 6 likelihood of Petitioner prevailing, that's our law. 7 We have to balance the merits on this. And without 8 making a final decision on the issue, if we think that 9 the 35 cents baseline, at least the second step of 10 that thinking process is dubious, is dubious, then that certainly adds to the strength of the motion for 11 stay, doesn't it? 12 It certainly adds to the 13 MR. DOROSHOW: 14 strength of it. However, the other --15 THE COURT: We should worry about the fact 16 that in the meantime there will be a -- by April there 17 won't be the funds going to the independent -- that's 18 your problem, so you could handle that, couldn't you? 19 MR. DOROSHOW: Well, no, actually, that's 20 a significant problem and I think that's the concern 21 that really should motivate the Court's decision on 22 this --23 Going to give any refunds? THE COURT: 24 MR. DOROSHOW: Can we give any refunds? 25 I don't think that it's in our power to do that.

THE COURT: Well, but that's going to too

THE COURT: We've got to weigh that too, 1 2 don't we? MR. DOROSHOW: Yes, but I think the harm 3 4 5 THE COURT: Are you going to adjust what's 6 finally done if we say that this premise is wrong, 7 sense and you come up with something 8 different and there is a disparity and you're going to 9 adjust the ultimate rate to reflect that disparity so 10 indeed they don't pay what they're now paying if it's the wrong rate? 11 MR. DOROSHOW: The problem with that 12 13 approach, Your Honor, is in the short run it will be 14 significant harm to the independent payphone providers 15 and the purpose of the statute was to --16 Well, I mean all you've done THE COURT: 17 is still harm. If our concerns are indeed valid, and 18 we can't find a valid basis, yes, you're talking about 19 harm to one group and another group is asserting harm 20 that they're feeling. 21 MR. DOROSHOW: But Congress has done that shifting for us. Congress has --22 23 No, think of this at this THE COURT: 24 point as a motion for stay. When we think about a 25 motion for stay we think of two factors, one, the

merits, who is likely to prevail; and two, the harm. 1 But no case can I remember in the last 12 years that 2 any Panel of this Court deny a stay when it thought 3 that the movant was going to win on the merits or 4 likely was going to win on the merits. In other 5 words, that tends to be your threshold question. 6 7 So it's very hard to say that recognizing the independent payphone association has a problem, 8 it's very hard to say well, they should get this money 9 even if we're very dubious about the 35 cent proxy. 10 I recognize that that is MR. DOROSHOW: 11 12 certainly a very significant component the balancing analysis the Court has to undertake. 13 However, I think that both the significance of the 14 harm to the payphone providers, coupled with the clear 15 congressional mandate here elevates that harm to 16 perhaps a somewhat extraordinary --17 But you're ignoring Judge THE COURT: 18 Edwards that Congress mandate that you do action, but 19 it doesn't say the Court should uphold illegal action 20 if it comes in within nine months. 21 Well, if I may, with the 22 MR. DOROSHOW: limited time I have --23 THE COURT: That would be a preclusion of 24 25 judicial review, wouldn't it?

MR. DOROSHOW: I don't think entirely.

But with the limited I have, if I may attempt to persuade the Court that the Commission's approach was, in fact, reasonable.

As the Court is aware, in the <u>Payphone I</u> decision this Court upheld as reasonable the 35 cent coin rate for coin calls. What the Court objected to in the <u>Payphone I</u> decision was the FCC's use of that exact same rate in the arena of coinless access code in 800 subscriber calls, noting that there was evidence in the record of some cost differences. And remanded the case to the Agency to account for those differences.

THE COURT: And that's the way the Agency interpreted the first opinion, namely, just the cost differential. That was the only problem. And they started at the same point and just deducted.

MR. DOROSHOW: Well, no. Actually, the Court looked at the whole matter anew and explained its reasons for why it used the market approach in the first instance. And there are actually two components here. The first question is why did we use the market based approach in the first place and then secondly, why do we use the coin rate as the proxy.

THE COURT: And then they said even if we

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2 point anyway. MR. DOROSHOW: That is true. We did do a 3 bottom up cost analysis as a means of checking the 4 validity of the coin rate minus avoided costs. 5 THE COURT: How do you find the market? 6 That was the problem. 7 MR. DOROSHOW: course, there is no market for the coinless calls. 8 You didn't start with a THE COURT: 9 How do you find one? market. 10 MR. DOROSHOW: We used the best available 11 surrogate and the coin rate, the coin market surrogate 12 is appropriate because they are virtually the same 13 They are the -- the cost involved in transactions. 14 both sets of calls are almost entirely identical. 15 There are some minor cost differences, as this Court 16 pointed out, but the vast majority of costs are the 17 It's the same seller in both instances. same. 18 the payphone provider. It's the same handset, the 19 same cradle, the same box, the same keypad, etcetera. 20 So it's an appropriate proxy for the market rate of 21 And what we have done, consistent 22 coinless calls. with this Court's instructions is address those 23 particular cost differences and subtracted them. 24 we started with what the Court viewed as a fair rate 25

take the cost information it all ends up at the same

32 for coin calls and then subtracted the rate, the cost 1 differences for a very similar sort of call and we 2 think ended up therefore with a fair rate for the 3 coinless market. 4 THE COURT: The FCC assumes that the rate 5 and cost converge and I don't, for the life of me, I can't figure that out. MR. DOROSHOW: Well, the market rates do 9

reflect costs, certainly, but it is not exactly the same thing as a cost based approach and the Commission explained quite clearly the reasons why a cost based approach --

THE COURT: I mean clearly enough to convince me it looks utterly irrational. only thing that seems clear. I mean I've gone through this thing a hundred times and it makes no sense to The assumptions are bizarre. To be very honest, if you want to take a shot at it, go ahead. I'm going to tel you my own views. It makes no sense. Rate and costs converge. You're assuming the coin and coinless markets and incentives are the same. It makes no I'm looking for the record to try to figure I can't figure it out for the life of me. this out.

> Well, when we did our --MR. DOROSHOW: It's not an interesting THE COURT:

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1 fiction. I don't know how you even get where you are. 2 It makes no sense. Well, for example, the 3 MR. DOROSHOW: point that Judge Rogers identified, when we did our 4 5 bottom up cost analysis as a means of checking the 6 validity of the rate, we arrived at a rate that was 7 quite close to the top down result. 8 THE COURT: Do you know what my reaction 9 to that is? If you thought that that was a viable approach, why didn't you just go with that and stick 10 11 with that? The other way makes no sense. MR. DOROSHOW: Well, the problem with the 12 13 cost based approach, Your Honor, is that what you 14 ultimately end up with, the cent amount, reflects on 15 the bare recovery of costs. One of the purposes of 16 Section 276, there are two principal goals, one of 17 them is the widespread deployment of payphones for the benefit of the public. With just recovering your 18 19 costs --20 THE COURT: Well, even if your just doing 21 costs, you can always have costs and capital in there 22 too which is your profit, etcetera. I mean if you 23 want to use rate, the standard rate based approach, you can do that and you certainly don't mean to 24

suggest that under the standard rate base method of

setting rates that one doesn't think of cost and capital. MR. DOROSHOW: This is true. However, if you ultimately end up with just a cost, a fixed average cost result, there are actually two problems with that in light of the purposes of the statute. First of all, there will not be widespread deployment of payphones because you will have this fixed average cost and therefore higher cost payphones, payphones in high cost locations, simply won't be deployed. virtues of a market base rate -do THE What COURT: Petitioners' response to that? They said that's silly in their reply brief and they gave me the reasons why they thought that was --MR. DOROSHOW: We actually think our position is quite reasonable. In fact, it's somewhat common sense that if there is a fixed rate of recovery, an average cost, that no one is going to to -- there's no incentive to deploy a higher cost phone. In this deregulated world in which we find ourselves, there's no requirement that a payphone implement a high cost phone and lose money and the rational payphone provider won't do that.

> THE COURT: Well, actually, the analogy

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to

challenged me on that. If I deployed a number of high 1 cost phones, I'd raise the average cost, right? 2 I'd make my low cost phones even more profitable? 3 True, but that's also --MR. DOROSHOW: 4 then you have intention with the other purpose of the 5 statute which is --6 THE COURT: Wait a minute. You were just 7 asking about my incentives and you challenged me and 8 I gave you an answer which is hey, I'll put up a lot 9 of high cost phones because that will raise my average 10 costs and that which I'll get compensated for and I'll 11 get even more profit on the low cost. 12 Well, I don't think that MR. DOROSHOW: 13 you would have the power to do that. 14 THE COURT: Wait a minute, don't you know 15 that it's one of the standard problems in rate based 16 tariff setting that the utilities try to add to their 17 costs, so as to get greater recovery? 18 MR. DOROSHOW: I'm not familiar with that 19 approach, Your Honor. 20 In any event, maybe the 21 THE COURT: problem is the FCC is not familiar with this. I'm not 22 sure you're right about that. I'm not quite as -- I 23 mean I see a little bit more of a potential argument 24 25 than my colleague does, but I don't -- it sure doesn't

| 1 | seem to me that the FCC has explained clearly the | | | | | | | |
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| 2 | second step whereby they say (a) there's a market | | | | | | | |
| 3 | rate for coin, which is under attack, but you have a | | | | | | | |
| 4 | response to that. But the second step that this is | | | | | | | |
| 5 | the appropriate proxy, the market rate for coin is | | | | | | | |
| 6 | appropriate proxy for the hypothetical market rate for | | | | | | | |
| 7 | noncoin is more troubling. There's not much to | | | | | | | |
| 8 | explain that. | | | | | | | |
| 9 | MR. DOROSHOW: Well, actually there is | | | | | | | |
| 10 | quite a bit to explain. | | | | | | | |
| 11 | THE COURT: In the opinion? | | | | | | | |
| 12 | MR. DOROSHOW: Yes. | | | | | | | |
| 13 | THE COURT: Which is? | | | | | | | |
| 14 | MR. DOROSHOW: Which is that the costs of | | | | | | | |
| 15 | both involving both sets of costs | | | | | | | |
| 16 | THE COURT: Well, now you're mixing costs | | | | | | | |
| 17 | and market rate. | | | | | | | |
| 18 | THE COURT: That's exactly right, that's | | | | | | | |
| 19 | what they do. Rate and market converge. You see, | | | | | | | |
| 20 | Judge Silberman says he's not quite as dubious as me | | | | | | | |
| 21 | except he goes right to the point that makes no sense | | | | | | | |
| 22 | to me. That assumption that you raise is | | | | | | | |
| 23 | THE COURT: When I say I'm not quite as | | | | | | | |
| 24 | dubious | | | | | | | |
| 25 | (Laughter.) | | | | | | | |

THE COURT: -- I didn't mean to suggest I 1 wasn't dubious. 2 (Laughter.) 3 MR. DOROSHOW: It's more than just a cost 4 analysis here. It's the same transaction essentially. 5 In both instances, you have the handset, the cradle, 6 the keypad, the connection for the local exchange 7 carrier, the podium --8 THE COURT: But they say that purchaser is 9 totally different. 10 MR. DOROSHOW: I'm sorry? 11 THE COURT: They say that purchaser is 12 totally different. 13 Well, that's actually MR. DOROSHOW: 14 The Petitioners make that somewhat of a fallacy. 15 The caller certainly in the coin context the 16 caller is the buyer. In the coinless context, even 17 for access code long distance phone calls, the caller 18 is ultimately the buyer there as well. It's only the 19 20 subscriber 800 situation where the 800 subscriber is the buyer. But in some sense, it's irrelevant, the 21 extent to which the market differs first of 22 because the markets are largely similar. And 23

secondly, because the issue here is establishing a

fair rate of compensation for the use of this facility.

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it's just totally believable because the markets are similar? So what? Your glib, dripping past, that is just what the FCC did and I want you to know there's some other people in the world who we think were somewhat intelligent and look at that and say I don't know what they're talking about. The markets don't look similar. They don't feel similar. You haven't presented anything to convince another intelligent person looking at that they're similar. And that's a critical premise you make.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this, all of your arguments suggest that this is not the typical case where the Agency is saying remand this so we can reconsider and go back and address things that the Court is concerned about. The Court in the first opinion told you that it was troubled by the 35 cents and basically in the second order, the FCC just again says this is a proper surrogate, end of discussion, moving on we'll deduct some costs.

So isn't the Court or is the Court faced with a situation of I don't mean this in a disrespectful way, but sort of intransigence by the Agency that it's decided this is the way that the scheme should be developed and reconsideration isn't

39 going to change that. There's nothing to indicate 1 anything that the Commission has said, including the 2 Bureau's most recent ruling that the Commission is 3 likely to address the fundamental concern that Chief Judge Edwards and Judge Silberman have been discussing 5 So why should we defer? with you this morning. If I may, I actually MR. DOROSHOW: disagree with the premise of the question which is that we just are -- we were wedded to the market rate without careful analysis. In fact --11

THE COURT: No, that's not what I said. I said that you're going to start with that 35 cents, all right, and then you're going to make these arguments and tell us that the market is similar and you believe that and the Commission believes it and so there's no point in our staying anything because the Commission is stuck with that.

In other words, the cases that we have so far is where there has been some hint by the Agency that it wants to reconsider, that something has come to its attention, so there's some point to delaying. Where is there any hint here that the Commission is likely to come to grips with what these questions have suggested is troubling?

THE COURT: You understand Judge Rogers is

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dubious even in delaying long enough to give you a 1 stay. She thinks your position is so relatively weak 2 that we should go right to the merits. 3 THE COURT: Actually, I'm only asking you 4 a question. 5 (Laughter.) 6 THE COURT: She's also much more polite 7 than Judge Silberman and I are. 8 (Laughter.) 9 MR. DOROSHOW: Well, I guess there are a 10 few responses to that question. First of all, all of 11 the issues are, of course, are on the table on 12 reconsideration and in fact, the Petitioners have 13 filed comments and have weighed in on every issue. 14 I mean in some of the other 15 THE COURT: cases, the Commission has suggested well, there are 16 new members on the Commission, they're re-examining 17 18 things, all that sort of thing. Is that a factor here? 19 MR. DOROSHOW: I can't speak to that. 20 THE COURT: All right, so there's no hint 21 22 in that regard. MR. DOROSHOW: I honestly can't speak to 23 24 that either way. 25 What I'm getting at is there THE COURT:

is so much water over the dam, are we just going to be back here a year from now basically faced with the same record?

THE COURT: Or if we wallop you, I mean, another way to ask the same question, if we wallop you with a stay, it's very clear what we're suggesting. Are you still going to be intransigent? Another way to ask what Judge Rogers is saying is the Commission still going to stonewall? And if so, then maybe what she's suggesting makes sense. Let's put it to rest now.

THE COURT: Another way of putting the question is in the first opinion I thought at any rate, when I read it that the Court indicated some substantial concern about starting with 35 cents. But the Commission's second order suggests to me at any rate the way I'm reading it and maybe I'm incorrect, that it viewed the Court's first opinion to say look, there are some differences in costs here, so address those and the Commission says fine, we'll address them. And that was the extent of the Commission's view of the Court's first opinion.

MR. DOROSHOW: I think the Commission went further than that. I think we started from first principles. We started with the question of why use

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| 1 | a market approach? Why use a market proxy? And we | | | | | | |
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| 2 | went to great lengths to explain the reasons for doing | | | | | | |
| 3 | that. | | | | | | |
| 4 | THE COURT: That should worry you having | | | | | | |
| 5 | gone to great lengths if you haven't persuaded | | | | | | |
| 6 | anybody. | | | | | | |
| 7 | THE COURT: Forgive me, counsel, but it | | | | | | |
| 8 | strikes me that the Commission took the Sir Edmund | | | | | | |
| 9 | Hillary approach, do you remember when he was asked | | | | | | |
| 10 | why he climbed Mount Everest and he said because it | | | | | | |
| 11 | was there. It looks like the Commission said we took | | | | | | |
| 12 | 35 cents because it was there. | | | | | | |
| 13 | MR. DOROSHOW: I disagree with that, Your | | | | | | |
| 14 | Honor. In fact, we can | | | | | | |
| 15 | THE COURT: Well, your time is up. Finish | | | | | | |
| 16 | your last sentence. | | | | | | |
| 17 | MR. DOROSHOW: Okay, Your Honor, if there | | | | | | |
| 18 | are no further questions I'll give my time over to Mr. | | | | | | |
| 19 | Kellogg. | | | | | | |
| 20 | ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL KELLOGG, ESQ. | | | | | | |
| 21 | ON BEHALF OF INTERVENORS | | | | | | |
| 22 | Chief Judge Edwards, and may it please the | | | | | | |
| 23 | Court | | | | | | |
| 24 | THE COURT: Mr. Kellogg, I've seen you | | | | | | |
| 25 | come from the floor before successfully. | | | | | | |
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| 1 | THE COURT: You're in the basement now. |
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| 2 | (Laughter.) |
| 3 | MR. KELLOGG: I'm moving up, I hope. Let |
| 4 | me start by assuring the Court that the Commission did |
| 5 | address directly and exactly the Court's concern of |
| 6 | why start with the 35 cent rate. |
| 7 | THE COURT: We understand they attempted |
| 8 | to address the question being raised is have they |
| 9 | done it in any way that makes any sense that's |
| 10 | rational? |
| 11 | MR. KELLOGG: Absolutely. Absolutely. |
| 12 | Please let me explain. Paragraph 42 of the opinion, |
| 13 | Joint Appendix 1436, they explained that the reason |
| 14 | they started with the local coin rate and then did a |
| 15 | voided cost was to insure that each type of payphone |
| 16 | call makes the same contribution to joints and common |
| 17 | costs so that the payphone owner is indifferent to |
| 18 | whether it's a local coin call or a dial around call. |
| 19 | THE COURT: But look at that very page. |
| 20 | They say "our general approach is to start with the |
| 21 | market rate for local coin service, 35 cents." |
| 22 | MR. KELLOGG: And they explain what, |
| 23 | because they want to have each type of call |
| 24 | THE COURT: And subtract costs directly |
| 25 | attributable to coin calls and add costs specific to |

access code and subscriber 800 calls. 1 THE COURT: They're not the same markets. 2 MR. KELLOGG: No, the point is --3 THE COURT: You can't say it and make it 4 so. 5 MR. KELLOGG: The point is -- it's a 6 fundamental question that the other side has never 7 answered and I would love to hear Mr. Morris' answer 8 when he stands up in rebuttal. Why should a business 9 10 caller using a credit card pay less, make less of a contribution to the joint and common costs of that 11 payphone than some quy standing on a street corner 12 fishing coins out of his pocket. 13 THE COURT: Look, Mr. Kellogg, the problem 14 is it's the FCC that says the markets are essentially 15 the same --16 MR. KELLOGG: No. 17 You just heard FCC 18 THE COURT: Yes. 19 counsel get up here and say exactly what the Agency 20 has said, that's the way the three of us have read it 21 and you can't make that go away. That is the starting premise, as they call first principles. 22 principle makes no sense and it has not been justified 23 24 in this case.

MR. KELLOGG: What I understand it to mean

| 1 | and I think the key passage is right there in 42 where | | | | | | |
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| 2 | they talk about the same contribution to joint and | | | | | | |
| 3 | common costs | | | | | | |
| 4 | THE COURT: In other words, your view now, | | | | | | |
| 5 | your view now is that this has got nothing to do with | | | | | | |
| 6 | markets whatsoever. | | | | | | |
| 7 | MR. KELLOGG: No, they are very similar | | | | | | |
| 8 | markets. There's no question about that. | | | | | | |
| 9 | THE COURT: No, no, no. But the rationale | | | | | | |
| 10 | you're making has got nothing to do with the market | | | | | | |
| 11 | rationale, right? | | | | | | |
| 12 | MR. KELLOGG: Oh, it does, absolutely. | | | | | | |
| 13 | It's quite a complicated thing, but do let me explain. | | | | | | |
| 14 | THE COURT: Go ahead. | | | | | | |
| 15 | MR. KELLOGG: They really made two | | | | | | |
| 16 | methodological decisions. The first one and the | | | | | | |
| 17 | critical step was they wanted to use a market based | | | | | | |
| 18 | not a cost based approach. | | | | | | |
| 19 | Now I understood the premise of a lot of | | | | | | |
| 20 | the questions here to be assuming that the only | | | | | | |
| 21 | legitimate regulatory approach is sort of a bottoms up | | | | | | |
| 22 | cost base. And that's not what Congress said in the | | | | | | |
| 23 | statute. They said fair compensation. | | | | | | |
| 24 | THE COURT: I think your brief was, if may | | | | | | |
| 25 | say so, elegantly and brilliantly put to suggest that | | | | | | |

the only alternatives were cost based or the present rule. Do you really analytically think that's true?

MR. KELLOGG: You know, the other side never came up with a single alternative market based proposal.

point of which I'd like to ask them about that because it may well be that -- but you see they don't have to. If they say look, we would have liked cost base, but what the FCC has done is unreasonable. Is it their -- as a matter or administrative law, is it their obligation to come up with some other third position which might be thought by the Court to be reasonable?

MR. KELLOGG: I think it is if the first

step in the Commission's analysis --

THE COURT: Not as a matter of rule, not if their analysis -- you see, it's interesting. You're trying to -- what you start out by saying, you're right, what they meant to say. That doesn't cut it. Because the FCC counsel just stood here who represents the Agency doesn't say what you say. Now you may be right. You have a way you can do it, but you better get the Agency to embrace that view and to 'fess up if what you're suggesting is true because that's not the way they've analyzed it.

| 1 | MR. KELLOGG: It does say it though, right |
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| 2 | in the order in paragraph 42. I mean it says this way |
| 3 | we insure that the payphone provider is indifferent |
| 4 | whether it's a coin call or a dial around call. |
| 5 | THE COURT: Why all the language in the |
| 6 | order that talks about the markets, the markets |
| 7 | similarity, converging of costs and markets |
| 8 | MR. KELLOGG: The markets are similar in |
| 9 | the sense that there is a large proportion of joint |
| 10 | and common costs shared between the two types of |
| 11 | costs. We submitted testimony by Professor Jerry |
| 12 | Houseman of MIT, a noted economist who said that in a |
| 13 | voided cost analysis like this, he's just fine, it's |
| 14 | perfectly acceptable economics. Congress itself in |
| 15 | the 1996 Act |
| 16 | THE COURT: The voided cost analysis for |
| 17 | which part of it? |
| 18 | MR. KELLOGG: Starting with the market |
| 19 | rate of the coin call and with the offsets of 35 |
| 20 | cents. |
| 21 | THE COURT: The voided cost doesn't get |
| 22 | you to 35 cents. |
| 23 | MR. KELLOGG: You start from the 35 cents. |
| 24 | THE COURT: That's the problem. |
| 25 | MR. KELLOGG: No, but he explained why |

with a lot of joint and common costs --1 THE COURT: Go ahead. 2 This has nothing to do with THE COURT: 3 voided costs. Go ahead. 4 if anything, the MR. KELLOGG: See, 5 Commission's approach was highly conservative here. 6 What Professor Houseman explained is when you have a 7 8 lot of joint and common costs in common, you usually look to demand substitution factors. 9 Like in the airline industry, business travelers pay a lot more 10 than local travelers. In this context, business 11 callers, callers using credit cards are quite willing 12 to pay a lot more for the use of that pay phone. 13 THE COURT: Is the FCC assuming that this 14 15 is a perfectly competitive market? MR. KELLOGG: The FCC is assuming that it 16 is workably competitive and this Court affirms that. 17 THE COURT: You know I'm about to ask you, 18 are they -- they have said in the first case I thought 19 here again it's not a perfectly competitive market. 20 If that's the case you've got real problems 21 suggesting that just willy-nilly go off into costs and 22 23 rates converge. And you know that. What they said is two 24 MR. KELLOGG: 25 They said it's not yet competitive because --

| 2 | understanding the first time around and nothing | | | | | | | |
|----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 3 | changed. It's far from a perfectly competitive | | | | | | | |
| 4 | market. | | | | | | | |
| 5 | MR. KELLOGG: But that is not correct, | | | | | | | |
| 6 | Judge Edwards, because the first time | | | | | | | |
| 7 | THE COURT: It's a perfectly competitive | | | | | | | |
| 8 | market? | | | | | | | |
| 9 | MR. KELLOGG: You affirmed the | | | | | | | |
| 10 | Commission's conclusion that they could deregulate the | | | | | | | |
| 11 | local coin rate and the competitive forces would keep | | | | | | | |
| 12 | that at competitive levels. Now that means it's a | | | | | | | |
| 13 | workably competitive market and nobody, not one of the | | | | | | | |
| 14 | Petitioners has come in and said no, it's not because | | | | | | | |
| 15 | look at the experience in such and such a state. | | | | | | | |
| 16 | THE COURT: The FCC itself has said that | | | | | | | |
| 17 | it is not a perfectly competitive market. | | | | | | | |
| 18 | MR. KELLOGG: It doesn't have to be | | | | | | | |
| 19 | perfectly competitive. | | | | | | | |
| 20 | THE COURT: In order for them to be able | | | | | | | |
| 21 | to make the argument that they're making resting on | | | | | | | |
| 22 | the convergence of rates and costs, it becomes real | | | | | | | |
| 23 | problematic if you don't have something approaching a | | | | | | | |
| 24 | strongly competitive market. | | | | | | | |
| 25 | MR. KELLOGG: No, you are buying into | | | | | | | |

THE COURT: It's far from it is our

their premise that the whole point of a market based 1 approach is to reach a surrogate for cost and that's 2 not what they were doing here. They specifically said 3 we're not doing a cost based approach. 4 Cost based approach would be --5 THE COURT: Then why are you deducting 6 7 cost offsets? You're mixing apples and oranges, aren't you? 8 MR. KELLOGG: No, you're not mixing apples 9 and oranges and Professor Houseman has explained why 10 you're not mixing apples and oranges. 11 Congress itself in the 1996 Act mandated 12 an avoided cost analysis in determining rates for 13 You start with the retail rate and you resale. 14 15 subtract costs. I'm only asking why do you THE COURT: 16 have the cost offsets off the figure if the figure is 17 not designed to reflect costs anyway? 18 MR. KELLOGG: Because the result they're 19 looking for is a market based surrogate, not a cost 20 21 based surrogate. Do you see my concern about 22 THE COURT: 23 apples and oranges being put together? 24 MR. KELLOGG: No, it's not apples and 25 oranges.

It looked the apples is what THE COURT: we want and the oranges is what the Court wanted so we took the oranges off the apples. Isn't that really the way it looks? MR. KELLOGG: No. I think in economics an avoided cost analysis starting with the market rate and adjusting for costs is perfectly acceptable when you want to reach a market based rate and they explain several good reasons why they wanted a market base, For one thing, they want to not a cost base rate. They don't want to be deregulate this market. involved in yearly rate of return regulation. THE COURT: I think you're absolutely right in making the argument that the FCC doesn't have to go to a cost based system. I think that's right. I think this Court recognized that before. The problem is sort of -- where we are is sort of the half slave, half free and we can't quite figure it out. I also have a sense that it may well be that there is, this is a strange animal here and that there is no pre-existing way of doing this that's going to look exactly right. It involves some new

thinking as to how to come up with an answer that will

be reasonable that would get by. It may well be that

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| 1 | the 35 cents, it may well be that the argument of the | | | | | | |
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| 2 | relationship between the coin operated pay phone and | | | | | | |
| 3 | the noncoin operated pay phone is so close that you | | | | | | |
| 4 | can't hypothetically think about the noncoin operated | | | | | | |
| 5 | market. It may well be. But I haven't seen an | | | | | | |
| 6 | explanation in the FCC's opinion that explains that. | | | | | | |
| 7 | MR. KELLOGG: Well, I think the relation | | | | | | |
| 8 | | | | | | | |
| 9 | THE COURT: It doesn't look to me like the | | | | | | |
| 10 | FCC's opinion was written with the sophistication of | | | | | | |
| 11 | some Intervenor's briefs. | | | | | | |
| 12 | MR. KELLOGG: Well, once you thank you. | | | | | | |
| 13 | Once you get over the first hurdle and say that we | | | | | | |
| 14 | want a market based, not a cost based rate, that the | | | | | | |
| 15 | statute allows them to choose a market base. After | | | | | | |
| 16 | all, it's a critical consideration that you want a | | | | | | |
| 17 | payphone in a remote location on a mountain in Alaska | | | | | | |
| 18 | to cost more than a payphone downtown because it | | | | | | |
| 19 | wouldn't be there otherwise because it costs a lot | | | | | | |
| 20 | more to put it there. You want the flexibility of | | | | | | |
| 21 | different rates. | | | | | | |
| 22 | THE COURT: Maybe, maybe. We don't know | | | | | | |
| 23 | that. | | | | | | |
| 24 | MR. KELLOGG: That's why the FCC can | | | | | | |
| 25 | make an expert judgment to that effect. | | | | | | |

THE COURT: That's right, they could. Is 1 that the judgment that's made? 2 MR. KELLOGG: They did explain that. They 3 did explain that they want to allow for variations of 4 5 costs. THE COURT: If they require a lot of money 6 7 for call, there will be more payphones. I understood that. 8 (Laughter.) 9 MR. KELLOGG: They also, well, in a sense 10 the judgment they're making about the rate is a 11 judgment about the deployment of payphones, the higher 12 the rate, the more payphones, the lower, the less. 13 You wouldn't for a moment 14 THE COURT: stand there and say that any rate is justified and it 15 will produce more pay phones. 16 MR. KELLOGG: But the thing is --17 THE COURT: I'm not even sure that's true 18 because then people will figure a way to bypass it. 19 The thing that's really 20 MR. KELLOGG: critical here is that the FCC had a number of 21 proposals for market based solutions. We said look, 22 we think you should look at the 0+ commissions that 23 the IXCs are willing to pay. They pay up to a dollar 24 25 a call for those calls because they make about \$2.50

| 1 | in revenue on them. So that's why they want them. | | | | | | | |
|----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | The reason dial around has increased so much is | | | | | | | |
| 3 | because they get those for free. They don't have to | | | | | | | |
| 4 | pay that dollar and they still make their \$2.50. | | | | | | | |
| 5 | THE COURT: Who is "they"? | | | | | | | |
| 6 | MR. KELLOGG: We get nothing. The | | | | | | | |
| 7 | inter-exchange carriers. | | | | | | | |
| 8 | THE COURT: Gets it for free. | | | | | | | |
| 9 | MR. KELLOGG: And the LECs | | | | | | | |
| 10 | THE COURT: What do you mean gets it for | | | | | | | |
| 11 | free? | | | | | | | |
| 12 | MR. KELLOGG: Because the dial around they | | | | | | | |
| 13 | don't have to pay, they have not, historically, had to | | | | | | | |
| 14 | pay compensation on those calls. They don't have to | | | | | | | |
| 15 | pay the contract and commissions. | | | | | | | |
| 16 | THE COURT: Don't they have any access | | | | | | | |
| 17 | charges? | | | | | | | |
| 18 | MR. KELLOGG: The access charge has been | | | | | | | |
| 19 | removed. That was the whole point of 276. Our | | | | | | | |
| 20 | payphones used to be subsidized and we didn't get | | | | | | | |
| 21 | anything for those calls. We've removed all those | | | | | | | |
| 22 | subsidies over a year ago. | | | | | | | |
| 23 | Now our payphones are in desperate straits | | | | | | | |
| 24 | because they're not paying. | | | | | | | |
| 25 | THE COURT: Your time is up. | | | | | | | |

| 1 | MR. KELLOGG: Thank you, Your Honor. | | | | | | | |
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| 2 | THE COURT: We got you. Thank you. Is | | | | | | | |
| 3 | there any time on rebuttal? | | | | | | | |
| 4 | CLERK: Mr. Morris has no time. Mr. | | | | | | | |
| 5 | Kramer has two minutes. | | | | | | | |
| 6 | THE COURT: What about his question he put | | | | | | | |
| 7 | to you, you've never come up with any position. | | | | | | | |
| 8 | You're certainly not taking the position here that the | | | | | | | |
| 9 | FCC must come up with a based system a la public | | | | | | | |
| 10 | utilities? | | | | | | | |
| 11 | REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN B. MORRIS, ESQ. | | | | | | | |
| 12 | ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS MCI | | | | | | | |
| 13 | MR. MORRIS: No, Your Honor, we are not | | | | | | | |
| 14 | suggesting that as a matter of law. | | | | | | | |
| L 5 | THE COURT: And they are certainly | | | | | | | |
| ۱6 | entitled to reach towards market rate. | | | | | | | |
| L7 | MR. MORRIS: They certainly are and I'm | | | | | | | |
| 18 | hopeful on remand or after a stay that the Agency will | | | | | | | |
| 19 | be able to do some creative thinking as | | | | | | | |
| 20 | THE COURT: Well, what about your position | | | | | | | |
| 21 | on this? | | | | | | | |
| 22 | THE COURT: What does that mean? How can | | | | | | | |
| 23 | they do creative thinking if there's nothing to think | | | | | | | |
| , | about? That's essentially what Mr. Kellogg is saying | | | | | | | |
| 24 | about the boundary made the society | | | | | | | |

MR. MORRIS: Well, I mean I would suggest 1 that costs have to be an important factor because as 2 we've gone through this exercise now two times, there 3 is not as far as I can tell, a good way to estimate 4 the market --5 Because there is no square THE COURT: 6 market that we can think of for the dial around 7 services? 8 MR. MORRIS: Absolutely. There is simply 9 no good proxy that we can come up with. 10 THE COURT: If that's true, if that's true 11 and yet in the long run market rate is the right way 12 to go, why isn't their basic approach correct, then? 13 MR. MORRIS: Well, I would suggest that 14 it's --15 THE COURT: They being the FCC. 16 If the FCC truly wants to 17 MR. MORRIS: have a market approach, then it should reconsider as 18 it was asked to do on the second go around, the caller 19 pays of option, because a caller pays option will get 20 back to as Mr. Kellogg wants, the situation where he's 21 pointing out that businessman on the street should pay 22 the same 35 cents. Well, the problem is is that the 23 24 FCC, there's no explanation as to why --THE COURT: It's so nice to her the RBOCs 25

make such a redistribution as to argue. 1 2 (Laughter.) It's not usually the kind of thing we see 3 from Mr. Kellogg. 4 I mean there are certainly 5 MR. MORRIS: problems with caller pays and issues as to why the FCC 6 may not want to do that, but that would be a market 7 solution that is actually remarkably close to the 8 local coin situation. The person who decides to use 9 the payphone pays for the call. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 THE COURT: All I can say as one Judge, I 12 find this thing very confusing and very mystifying and 13 very difficult. It's not an easy question, but I am 14 inclined to have the same view of my colleagues here 15 that the FCC, there may be something here that we 16 don't understand but I think it's because the FCC 17 hasn't tried to explain it. 18 MR. MORRIS: I would say the FCC has not 19 explained it and the only explanation proffered by 20 either Mr. Kellogg or the FCC is paragraph 42 and as 21 Judge Rogers pointed out, that's taken entirely out of 22 They start paragraph 42 with a market rate 23 assumption. 24

THE COURT:

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That's a good point, though.

All right. 1 MR. MORRIS: Thank you. 2 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ALBERT H. KRAMER, ESQ. 3 ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS, ILLINOIS PUBLIC 4 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION 5 First of all, Judge Rogers, in response to 6 7 your question, the FCC does have authority to order a 2 up here while the rates remain in effect, to order 8 9 payment and order a subsequent adjustment. cite you to page 572 of the Joint Appendix, footnote 10 4 for Natural Gas (Inaudible) v. FERC, and Public 11 Utilities Commission of California v. FERC, are cited. 12 Indeed, we are waiting just such a true-up on the 13 interim which is still hanging out there --14 You started off by saying 15 THE COURT: what, they have the authority to do what, I missed 16 17 you? They have an authority to MR. KRAMER: 18 order a retroactive true-up. Judge Rogers inquired 19 whether they could order this rate and then order a 20 true-up later. And the answer is yes, that authority 21 22 has been upheld by the Courts. 23 Your Honor, Judge Silberman, you indicated 24 in addressing a stay you have two issues to address 25 the merits and the equities. I would like to speak to

59 the equities for a moment. You should understand that 1 what is going on here is the carriers have been 2 collecting this money from end users for over a year 3 now and none of that money is going to the payphone 4 5 providers. So you have a horribly inequitable situation where the carriers are collecting and --6 7 THE COURT: Suppose we're inclined to believe that the 35 cents starting point is -- we're 8 inclined to believe it's unreasonable. And therefore 9 the Petitioners are likely to prevail on the merits. 10 11

What is the nature of the stay that should be granted

in your view? 12

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MR. KRAMER: Your Honor, in my view what the Court should do in that case is that the Court should order the rate to stay in effect, pending a true-up as is authorized under the cases I just cited. And that there would have to be some true-up at the point, but in the meantime since the Court does not have rate making authority, the Court should allow a rate to stay in effect. It's fundamental that there should be a rate. That is what Congress mandated.

THE COURT: Well, what was the situation there was no rate at all during the period of time after this -- the rule was vacated, right?

> MR. KRAMER: There has been no rate and

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that's been the problem, Your Honor. 1 THE COURT: No, I mean so you lived under 2 that circumstance because the FCC's rule was vacated 3 by this Court. 4 MR. KRAMER: If you could call it living, 5 I suppose you did. 6 (Laughter.) 7 But that isn't -- there is an We did. 8 enormous catch crunch they are not living and that's 9 the reason why we're so concerned about a stay and in 10 calling to the Court's attention there the 11 authority to order a true-up here. 12 Remember, we're talking about something in 13 1995, we're not just talking about the legislation 14 In 1995, this Court had to reverse the FCC 15 here. because it failed to order dial around compensation on 16 1-800 calls in the Florida Pay Telephone case, 17 we're looking at a long history here. And I would 18 again emphasize that -- although I think the Court has 19 20 the point that there is no requirement here that this be a cost based rate --21 THE COURT: I think you ought to focus on 22 the stay question now. 23 MR. KRAMER: All right. Well, Your Honor 24

THE COURT: And do it in one more sentence, because you're done, your time is up.

MR. KRAMER: Thank you, Your Honor, may I

just indulge for one moment to address one point that Mr. Kellogg addressed and I'd like to try to clear up something Judge Silberman said.

Judge Silberman, you were concerned about this seeming apples and oranges comparison. The reason for the apples and oranges comparison because if you begin from the premise that Mr. Kellogg correctly begins from, that the FCC's objective here was to say in a market as close as they could get to a market here, all costs should bear a fair share of joint and common costs. Having begun from the apple, the FCC then had to say but we're called upon here to engage in an exercise where we have to take an orange, namely a voided cost to make sure that we're meeting that standard. So when you're looking, you may be looking at an apples and oranges analysis, but it's because you had to have a basket of fruit to make it come out correctly, not because the FCC was comparing two wrong things.

THE COURT: I understand the FCC's position.

MR. KRAMER: Thank you.

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| 1 | | THE COURT: | Okay, | thank y | ou. | The | case | is |
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| 2 | submitted. | | | | | | | |
| 3 | | (Whereupon, | oral | argument | was | conc | luded | 1.) |
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Petitioner,

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

DATE: MAY 7, 1998

I hereby certify that the attached transcription of pages 1 to 62 inclusive are to the best of my belief and ability a true, accurate, and complete record of the proceedings as recorded on tape provided to us by the agency.

Frances ca Zook 05/12/98